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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied Mr. McCabe's Request for 
Appointment of Counsel. 
Mr. McCabe agrees with much of the state's brief. First, he agrees that he had a "right to 
conflict-free representation" under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brief of Respondent 
("State's Brief'), pg. 6. And he acknowledges that in order to prevail he must eventually show 
that his attorney had an actual conflict of interest and that counsel's performance was affected by 
the conflict. Id., 6-7. However, he is not asking the Court at this point to grant the petition. He 
is only asking that the counsel be appointed to assist him. And all he needs to do in order to 
obtain court-appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-4904 is allege facts that raise the possibility of a 
valid claim. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). He did so 
and the district court erred by dismissing the petition without appointing him counsel. 
First, Mr. McCabe alleged some facts that raise the possibility of an actual conflict of 
interest. Mr. McCabe alleged that Ms. DePew was working under an actual conflict of interest 
due to the fixed-rate public defender contract. R 7-9. He attached a copy of the public defender 
contract to the petition. R 11-15. The fixed rate contract showed that the less work Ms. DePew 
did, the higher her effective hourly compensation would be and the more time she would have to 
work on her private cases. The contract also required Ms. DePew to pay for any investigative 
services out of her overhead thus decreasing her profit. To establish an actual conflict, defense 
counsel must be shown to have "actively represented conflicting interests." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. at 350 (1980). Here the competing interests were Ms. DePew's duty to defend Mr. 
McCabe which required the expenditure of time and resources and her personal interest in 
maximizing her profit under the fixed rate contract by minimizing time spent and resources used. 
The state's arguments that "courts generally presume counsel" will subordinate his or her 
pecuniary interests in favor of the client's interest and that "no per se conflict arose from the 
fixed-fee arrangement between Jerome County and the Jerome County Public Defender," (State's 
Brief, pg. 7) miss the point. Mr. McCabe doesn't have to overcome any such presumption, if one 
in fact exists, 1 to be entitled to appointed counsel. He also doesn't have to show that there was a 
per se conflict of interest. He only needs to have alleged facts which lead to the possibility of an 
actual conflict. Thus, an allegation of facts showing a theoretical or possible conflict of interest 
is enough at this point. 
As Mr. McCabe alleged facts raising the possibility of a conflict of interest under Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), counsel should have been appointed. He did not need to allege 
facts establishing prejudice too before he was entitled to counsel. And as previously argued, Mr. 
McCabe was not even required to allege prejudice as presumption of prejudice may arise when 
1 But see contra, Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 294 (71h Cir. 1995) ("A conflict 
of interest arises 'when the defense attorney ... [is] required to make a choice advancing his own 
interests to the detriment of his client's interests."' citing United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 
1419 (71h Cir.1988). According to Daniels, "A conflict may also arise when a client's interests 
are adverse to his lawyer's pecuniary interests." Id., citing Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 308 (2nd 
Cir.1993) ( contingent fee in criminal case created actual conflict of interest), cert. denied, 511 
U.S. 1022 (1994); United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201,207 (Th Cir.1985) (attorney's interest 
in movie rights created potential conflict of interest), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986); United 
States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 741 (2nd Cir.1990) (prosecutor's attempt to use release of 
confiscated funds, which would be used to pay defense attorney, as bargaining chip in criminal 
case could create a conflict of interest), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991). See also United 
States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 139 (2nd Cir.1992) (where attorney compensated by persons 
alleged to represent the criminal enterprise actual conflict existed in handling of plea negotiation 
and offer to testify against others); People v. Gacy, 530 N.E.2d 1340, 134 7 (Ill. 1988) ("an 
acquisition by an attorney of a financial stake in litigation directly adverse to that of his client is a 
per se conflict, which warrants reversal even in the absence of prejudice"). 
2 
defendant's attorney actively represented conflicting interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162, 166 (2002); Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 4 75 (1978) ( conflict due to joint representation 
of co-defendants); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (same). 
The state's observation that the fixed-rate "was valid under Idaho law" at the time it was 
executed has nothing to do with the question of whether Mr. McCabe alleged some facts 
suggesting that the now invalid contract could have created a conflict of interest. In any case, all 
that can be said for that contract is that there was no statutory law invalidating the contract - a far 
cry from it being valid under Idaho law. Certainly, a contract which systematically violates the 
constitutional rights of the third-party beneficiary is at least arguably void for public policy. 
See Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952) (Where a person who is in a 
relationship of trust with a third person enters into an agreement which places his personal 
interest in conflict with the duty to third person the agreement is void as contrary to public 
policy.) 
Finally, Mr. McCabe alleged facts that raise the possibility he was prejudiced. He alleged 
he would not have sought to proceed pro se if he had been aware of the conflict of interest. 
Instead, he would have insisted that the court appoint conflict-free counsel to represent him. R 9. 
The loss of the benefit of conflict-free counsel, without more, raises the possibility Mr. McCabe 
suffered prejudice. Recall that Mr. McCabe did not ask to proceed prose until his original 
motion was denied. Finally, there is a possibility that Mr. McCabe's prose motion to suppress 
would have been granted had it been brought by conflict-free counsel. 
As Mr. McCabe alleged facts which established part of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, the court should have appointed counsel to assist him in developing that claim 
3 
pursuant to Charboneau. 
B. The Claim Was Not Waived. 
The state argues that Mr. McCabe waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In support. it points to Mr. McCabe's statement 
that he "discussed with appellate counsel the possibility of raising the constitutionality of the 
waiver of counsel[.]" State's Brief, pg. 10, citing R 55. That statement, however, does not 
establish that Mr. McCabe discussed raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A 
challenge to "the constitutionality of the waiver of counsel" is not the same as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. An unconstitutional waiver claim could be based upon Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which requires that the accused must "knowingly and 
intelligently" forgo the benefits ofrepresentation by counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, quoting 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 (1938). As previously noted, the conflict of interest 
could not have been raised during the criminal case because the existence of the contract was not 
known to Mr. McCabe. R 52 ("the petitioner had no knowledge of the contaminated public 
defender contract"). Mr. McCabe was sentenced on July 12, 2013, but the magicvalley.com 
article, "Flawed Idaho Public Defender System to Receive Few Fixes from New Law," was not 
posted until nine months later, April 5, 2014. R 18. And, it appears that Mr. McCabe did not 
obtain a copy of the fixed rate contract until sometime after September 29, 2014. See, R 16. The 
opinion in the direct appeal was issued on October 30, 2014. State v. McCabe, No. 41357, 2014 
WL 5500496, at *l (Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished). 
Even if Mr. McCabe's discussion with appellate counsel did relate to the conflict of 
interest issue, there is still no waiver because it is well-established that a claim of ineffective 
4 
assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Barce/la 
State, 148 Idaho 469. 477,224 P.3d 536,544 (Ct. App. 2009), citing Murray v. State, 121 
Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App.1992). See also, Nevarez v. State, 145 
Idaho 878, 885, 187 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct. App. 2008) (analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel that alleged a conflict of interest due to multiple representations of the defendant by 
defense counsel). In addition, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument more than 20 years 
ago in Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,806,839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). In that case, the 
Court wrote: 
The State argues on appeal that we need not reach the merits of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel issues because they, like the other issues, have been waived 
because they were not raised on appeal. We disagree. A special rule applies in 
these cases. A defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both. 
Id. Thus, the claim was not waived pursuant to Matthew's special rule. 
In addition, LC. § 19-490 I (b) is limited to those "issue[ s] "which could have been raised 
on direct appeal[.]" (Emphasis added.) The particular ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
here could not have been raised on direct appeal because it required the development of 
additional facts in the record, i.e., that the attorney had a conflict of interest and Mr. McCabe 
would have sought the assistance of conflict-free counsel had he been aware during the trial 
proceedings. Even though ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be raised on direct 
appeal, "if a defendant wishes the court to consider evidence outside of the record on direct 
appeal, she must pursue post-conviction relief." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d 
476,482 (2008). Additional evidence was needed in this case and thus Mr. McCabe was 
required to raise the claim in post-conviction under Yakovac. 
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Finally, the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal because Mr. McCabe did 
not raise the issue in the criminal case trial proceedings. In general, "Idaho's appellate courts 
will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010). Mr. McCabe could not have raised the claim on 
direct appeal because the conflict of interest was not "clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether 
the failure to object was a tactical decision" as required by Perry. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978. 
If McCabe discussed raising the ineffective of assistance of counsel claim on direct 
appeal with his appellate counsel, he would have been informed that such claims can and should 
be raised in post-conviction. Moreover, the claim here had to be raised in post-conviction 
because it required the court to consider evidence outside the appellate record and because the 
issue was not fundamental error under Perry. Thus, this claim is not barred under LC. § 19-
490 I (b) and the order dismissing the petition cannot be affirmed on that basis. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the opening brief, Mr. McCabe respectfully 
requests that the order dismissing his case be vacated. He also respectfully requests that the 
order denying his request for counsel be reversed and the matter be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this~'ct1y of December, 2015. 
- I Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Melvin McCabe 
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